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I. INTRODUCTION
For thousands of years, water management and infrastructure has played a
1
pivotal role in the development of civilization. In his book Water: The Epic
Struggle for Civilization, Steven Solomon traces the connection between water
and civilization, dating back 5,000 years, beginning with early civilizations in
2
Egypt and continuing on through those in Rome, China, and Britain. Each
civilization emerged and thrived as it overcame its water challenge. Water and its
3
infrastructure formed the critical link to the society’s success.

* After the author completed this article in July 2014, Governor Brown and legislative leaders negotiated
a water bond that won overwhelming voter approval in the November general election. The final water bond
reflected and resolved many of the water policy and finance debates discussed in this article.
** B.A., University of California Los Angeles, 1983; J.D., University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall
School of Law), 1988. The author currently serves as a Principal Consultant for the California State Assembly
and has also held positions at the Department of the Interior and on the Board of Directors for the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California.
1. STEVEN SOLOMON, WATER: THE EPIC STRUGGLE FOR WEALTH, POWER, AND CIVILIZATION 2 (2010).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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California’s history offers a great example of water’s centrality to a
4
successful civilization. At its formative moment—the 1849 Gold Rush—the first
5
conflicts and the first laws arose out of use of water. Miners, who needed water
to get access to Sierra Nevada gold, developed the “first in time, first in right”
6
principle that became the law of appropriation. The California Supreme Court
7
recognized this miners’ law in 1855 in Irwin v. Phillips. California went on to
finance and develop the most sophisticated water storage and conveyance
8
infrastructure anywhere in the world. Engineers overcame California’s greatest
hydrological challenge—2/3 of the water supply in the northern third of the state
9
and 2/3 of the water demand in the southern third. It built huge reservoirs in the
10
north and canals to take water hundreds of miles south.
In 2014, California’s central question is not whether to improve its water
11
infrastructure. That infrastructure continues to age and deteriorate. Much of that
infrastructure was built at mid-20th Century, so some water infrastructure has
12
aged past its design life. Climate change adds to the necessity to improve
California’s water infrastructure and adapt to changing conditions, especially the
13
loss of the Sierra Nevada snowpack. The central question is how to pay for
improving California’s water infrastructure––at the federal, state, and local
14
level.
15
Water finance questions implicate a wide range of policy issues and law.
Understanding these issues requires knowledge of the state’s history of water
16
finance. Creating the most sophisticated water system required funding from all
17
possible sources—private, federal, state, and local. California’s success in water
18
relied on drawing from all those sources as the system developed into the 1970s.
Then, the state’s voters began passing tax limitation initiatives such as
4. See, e.g., Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (1855); NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST:
CALIFORNIANS AND WATER A HISTORY (2001).
5. See Irwin, 5 Cal. at 146–47.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. AB 2686, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
9. See HUNDLEY, supra note 4, at 123–291.
10. Id. at 128.
11. See LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, INNOVATIVE WATER AND WASTEWATER INFRASTRUCTURE
FINANCING 1 (2014), available at http://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Policy-Advocacy-Section/
Federal-Issues/2014-Federal-Letters/Innovative-Water-Infrastructure-Financing.aspx (last visited Aug. 4, 2014)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See HUNDLEY, supra note 4.
15. ELLEN HANAK ET AL., PAYING FOR WATER IN CALIFORNIA 9 (Public Policy Institute of California
2014), available at http;//www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R314EHR.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 11.
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19

Proposition 13 in 1978, Proposition 218 in 1996, and Proposition 26 in 2010.
The provisions in the California Constitution limit state and local agencies’
20
abilities to impose fees. Proposition 218, however, treats water and sewer fees
21
differently. This history creates a substantial part of the water finance milieu in
22
which water planners and builders operate today.
Today, financing the next generation of water infrastructure requires
policymakers, at all levels of government, to resolve a host of issues.
23
Government finance law provides one set of issues. California’s water and
24
environmental policies provide another set. The state has used financing to
encourage water users—on farms and in cities—to act consistent with water
conservation, integrated regional water management, or water recycling
25
policies. Finally, voter preferences form the final link to success in financing
26
water infrastructure. Voters may have an opportunity to approve—or reject—
27
water infrastructure. An election may affect the physical project, the water rates,
or the taxes used to pay for the project. In any case, the law of water and public
finance shape the questions put before voters, and therefore the direction of
development of California’s water infrastructure.
II. HISTORY OF WATER INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE
The challenge of financing California water infrastructure emerged in the
earliest years of statehood, as demands for water for mining and agriculture
28
29
grew. In the early years, funding came primarily from private sources. These
sources included the corporations that invested in hydraulic mining after the
intrepid 49ers retreated from gold panning in the 1850s, until state and federal
30
courts deemed hydraulic mining a nuisance and stopped it, in 1884. In addition
to the usual corporate structures, California law created structures to encourage
31
development of communal water facilities. California law authorized “mutual

19. Id. at 9.
20. Id.
21. CAL. CONST. art. XIIID.
22. HANAK ET AL., supra note 15.
23. Id. at 9–10.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See AB 1331, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
27. Id.
28. See HUNDLEY, supra note 4, at 11.
29. HANAK ET AL., supra note 15, at 11.
30. See People v. Gold Run Ditch Co., 66 Cal. 138, 154 (1884); Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel
Mining Co., 18 F. 753 (D. Cal. 1884)
31. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14300–14312 (West 2006).
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water companies,” which were commonly formed by farmers joining together to
32
finance and build a water facility, such as a reservoir or a ditch.
33
The 19th century also saw the development of public water agencies. In
1861, the Legislature created a Board of Swampland Commissioners to design a
34
flood control program for a part of the Central Valley. In 1887, the Wright Act
35
authorized the creation of irrigation districts. To provide for financing and
development of water infrastructure, these districts enjoyed the authority to issue
36
bonds, levy taxes, and condemn property. Over the years, California law
37
authorized a plethora of special districts for water infrastructure. In urban areas,
cities and counties had authority to finance and develop water infrastructure for
38
their citizens. At the turn of the century, California’s major cities began
developing their own water infrastructure. Los Angeles developed its water
39
supply from the eastern side of the Sierra Nevada, in Owens Valley. San
Francisco gained federal authority to draw water from its Hetch Hetchy system in
40
Yosemite National Park.
The State Government first got involved in water infrastructure in 1933 when
the Legislature approved the first State Water Plan, which used revenue bonds to
finance the storage of water in Northern California for use in the San Joaquin
41
Valley. When the State could not finance the plan during the depression, the
42
United States Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), which is an agency of the
Department of the Interior, stepped in to finance and build the Central Valley
43
Project (CVP). The Legislature again engaged in financing of water
infrastructure, when it approved the State Water Project and placed a $1.75
billion general obligation (GO) bond on the 1960 ballot, at the urging of then44
Governor Pat Brown. The Burns-Porter Act placed a GO bond on the ballot, but

32. Id. §§ 14300 et seq. See Hildreth v. Montecito Creek Water Co., 139 Cal. 22, 29 (1903); Erwin v.
Gage Canal Co., 226 Cal. App. 2d 189, 192–93 (4th Dist. 1964).
33. Reclamation District Act, ch. 352, 1861 Cal. Stat. 355; Wright Act, 1887 Cal. Stat. 29.
34. Reclamation District Act, ch. 352, 1861 Cal. Stat. 355; CAL. WATER CODE §§ 50000–50013 (West
2014).
35. Wright Act, 1887 Cal. Stat. 29; WATER § 801 (West 2014).
36. Id.
37. HANAK ET AL., supra note 15, at 9.
38. Id.
39. See HUNDLEY, supra note 4, at 11.
40. Raker Act, Pub. L. No. 41, 63rd Congress, 38 Stats, at. L. 242, 242–245 (1913).
41. Central Valley Project Act, WATER §§ 11100–11160 (West 1992).
42. Congress created the Bureau of Reclamation to provide federal financing and construction of water
projects to “reclaim” dry lands for human use in the West, in the Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902, Pub. L 57161, 32 Stat. 388 (1902).
43. See U.S. Dep’t of the Interior: Bureau of Reclamation, Central Valley Project, RECLAMATION (Mar.
15, 2013), http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.jsp?proj_Name=Central+Valley+Project.
44. Warne v. Harkness, 60 Cal. 2d 579, 583–86 (1963).
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required the water agencies that received the water to pay the bond off through
45
contract.
The federal government has also contributed significantly to developing
46
California’s water infrastructure aside from the CVP. In 1893, Congress created
the California Debris Commission to address the hydraulic mining debris that
47
had filled Central Valley rivers and increased the risk of flooding. The
Commission’s recommendations led to the Legislature’s 1911 creation of the
Sacramento River Flood Control Plan and Congress’ adoption of the plan in
48
1917. The United States Army Corps of Engineers, therefore, has worked in
concert with state agencies and contributed significant funding in the last century
to implementing the plan and improving the flood control facilities in the Central
49
Valley. In 2006, voters approved two bonds that included $4.89 billion in state
50
funding for flood protection programs and facilities.
Reclamation made one of the most significant investments in California
51
water infrastructure when it built—and continues to operate—the CVP. Since
1902, Reclamation has played a critical role in financing water infrastructure,
52
primarily for agriculture, throughout the West. In California, Reclamation
53
remains the largest single holder of water rights, at 7 million acre-feet.
Reclamation’s finance structure includes substantial federal investment and
54
management of water infrastructure construction. Water contractors repay these
investments over several decades through repayment contracts for purchasing the
55
water, and generally with no interest charged. CVP contractors, however,
continue to repay the costs for CVP construction, which started in 1937, and
56
completed in 1979.

45. Burns-Porter Act CAL. WATER CODE §§ 12930–12937 (West 2009). The Burns-Porter Act was
approved by voters in 1960. Id.
46. See California Debris Commission, ch. 183, 27 Stat. 507, 95–96 (1893).
47. Id.
48. WATER § 12645(a) (West 2014).
49. Id.
50. Strategic Growth Plan: Bond Accountability, CAL. NATURAL RESOURCES AGENCY, http://bond
accountability.resources.ca.gov/p1E.aspx (last visited Aug. 12, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
51. Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, ch. 48, 49 Stat. 115, 115 (1935); Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1937, ch. 832, 50 Stat. 844, 850 (1937)
52. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, The Bureau of Reclamation: A Very Brief History,
USBR.GOV, http://www.usbr.gov/history/borhist.html (last visited July 14, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
53. Id.
54. “Water contractors” are the public agencies that contract with the Department of Water Resources or
the federal Bureau of Reclamation, to operate California’s large water projects that transfer water from the
Sacramento River watershed across the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta for south-of-Delta urban and agricultural
water use. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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III. LOCAL WATER SUPPLIER INVESTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA WATER
INFRASTRUCTURE
Despite the substantial federal and state investments in water infrastructure in
the last century, local water suppliers and wastewater agencies provide the
57
majority of funds for water infrastructure in California. According to a recent
report by the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC), local agencies provide
58
85% of the annual funding for water infrastructure. While water debates in
Congress and the State Legislature often receive the most statewide attention,
local water suppliers continue to build and operate the vast majority of
California’s water infrastructure, delivering water to homes and farms across the
59
state. According to PPIC, local agencies perform “reasonably well—providing
60
safe, reliable levels of service and preparing for future needs.”
A. Public Water Agencies: The Challenge of Constitutional Limitations
Public water agencies continue to own and operate most of California’s water
61
infrastructure. The Association of California Water Agencies claims that its
“nearly 440 public agency members collectively are responsible for 90% of the
62
water delivered to cities, farms and businesses in California.” These agencies,
which include special districts as well as general governments like cities, have
legal authority to raise revenues from a wide variety of sources, including
property taxes, water rates, charges (e.g. standby charges), and fees (e.g. hookup
63
fees). Proposition 13 (1978) substantially limited local agency authority to
64
collect property taxes, with its 1% cap on total property taxes from all agencies.
As a result, water agencies focused their revenue raising efforts on water rates
65
and fees.
Proposition 218 (1996). California voters passed Prop 218 to limit the
authority of special districts, including water agencies, to levy taxes and charge
66
fees by imposing requirements for public approval of special taxes and fees.
Specifically, Prop 218 requires two-thirds voter approval for special taxes and
57. HANAK ET AL., supra note 15, at 12.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2.
61. Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies, About ACWA, ACWA, http://www.acwa.com/content/about-acwa (last
visited Aug. 23, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
62. Id.
63. HANAK ET AL., supra note 15, at 15–16.
64. Id. at 19. In essence, Proposition 13 limited property taxes, to a total of 1% of assessed valuation, with
some exceptions, and restricted increases in assessed valuation until a property is sold. CAL. CONST., art. XIIIA
§ 2.
65. HANAK ET AL., supra note 15, at 19.
66. CAL. CONST., art. XIIIC–D. Article XIIIC addresses “voter approval for local tax levies” while
Article XIIID addresses “assessment and property-related fee reform.”
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67

majority voter approval for property-related fee assessments. However, Article
XIIID provides an exemption to voter-approval requirements for fee increases
68
“for sewer, water, and [trash] collection.” These fees proceed through a simpler
69
majority-protest process. The agency is required to give written notice of the fee
70
increase to property owners and hold a hearing. The agency may increase the
71
fee unless a majority of property owners file a protest to the fee. Rather than
having the people vote on every potential rate increase, this process makes
increasing water rates much simpler.
The California Supreme Court examined how Prop 218 applied to water
72
charges in 2004 and 2006. The Court recognized that Prop 218 does not apply
73
to new water connection fees, but water rates were “property-related fees” that
74
required compliance with Article XIIID of the Constitution—the majority75
protest process.
76
Prop 218 also includes substantive limitations on water rates. First, Article
XIIID prohibits water rates charged to a property owner from exceeding the
77
proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel. The agency therefore
must structure the rate carefully to capture all—but not more than—the costs
78
attributable to the property. Second, the water agency may use the revenues
79
only on water service and may not collect more than the costs of water service.
Cities, for example, may not use excess water service revenues on other
80
governmental services. Third, the rate may not include the costs for services
81
available to the general public. Cities may not use water service revenues to
82
cover the costs of watering city parks, for example.
While the water rate process is simpler, Prop 218 nevertheless discourages
water agencies from increasing rates too often by making each increase a careful,
83
deliberative decision. As PPIC observes, public retail water agencies will have
to explain more carefully and clearly the relationship between their water rate
structures and the cost of providing water service to their customers, link new
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

CAL. CONST. art. XIIID § (3)(2).
CAL. CONST. art. XIIID § 6(c).
CAL. CONST. art. XIIID § 4(c)–(e).
CAL. CONST. art. XIIID § 4(d)–(e).
CAL. CONST., art, XIIID
Richmond v. Shasta Cmty. Serv. Dist., 32 Cal. 4th 409 (2004).
Id. at 423.
Id. at 427.
Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil, 39 Cal. 4th 205, 220 n.7 (2006).
HANAK ET AL., supra note 15, at 19.
CAL. CONST. art. XIIID § 4.
HANAK ET AL., supra note 15, at 29.
CAL. CONST. art. XIIID § 6(2)(b)(1)–(2).
HANAK ET AL., supra note 15, at 19.
Id.
Id. at app. A 17.
Id. at 19.
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fees and rates to the projects and programs they are designed to fund, and justify
any differential treatment between or among classes of customers based on
84
differences in the cost of providing services to those classes. They also need to
make a greater effort to justify indirect costs of water infrastructure and service
that may not directly benefit the individual property owner, but benefits all
85
customers.
Proposition 26 (2010). Prop 26 redefined the term “tax” to ensure that
neither the state nor local agencies could impose “fees” that were, in effect, taxes
86
paying for general government services. The act’s findings asserted that
agencies “have disguised new taxes as ‘fees’ in order to extract even more
revenue from California taxpayers without having to abide by . . . [the Prop 13
87
supermajority] constitutional voting requirements.”
Prop 26 prohibits
“regulatory” fees, which may be adopted on a majority vote of the agency board
or the Legislature, from exceeding the reasonable cost of the regulation or paying
88
for general government services. It also limits fees for mitigating current or
prospective environmental harm, which overturns part of the California Supreme
Court’s Sinclair Paint decision that allowed a fee for past harm from selling lead
89
paint.
In effect, Prop 26 limits state and local discretion to impose fees to pay for
90
water infrastructure. By broadening the definition of “tax,” it imposes Prop 13’s
supermajority vote requirements on fees that have been used to fund water
91
infrastructure. After its passage, the Legislature considered bills in 2011 that
would have created statewide water infrastructure investment programs,
including the imposition of “public benefit” fees on water use to raise money for
92
water infrastructure—SB 34 (Simitian) and SB 571 (Wolk). SB 34 proposed to
use Prop 26’s exemption from the definition of taxes for fees for the use of state
93
94
property, because all water in California is owned by the people. Individuals
95
can only hold the right to its “reasonable and beneficial use.” Neither bill passed

84. Id. at app. A 16–17.
85. Id.
86. See LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, INNOVATIVE WATER AND WASTEWATER INFRASTRUCTURE
FINANCING 1 (2014), available at http://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Policy-Advocacy-Section/
Federal-Issues/2014-Federal-Letters/Innovative-Water-Infrastructure-Financing.aspx (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
87. LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE 15 (2011), available at
http://www.cacities.org/Prop26Guide (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
88. Id.
89. Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 15 Cal. 4th 866, 875 (1997).
90. HANAK ET AL., supra note 15, at 20.
91. Id.
92. SB 34 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010); SB 571, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
93. CAL. CONST., art. XIIIA, § 3(b). “(4) A charge imposed for entrance to or use of state property, or the
purchase, rental, or lease of state property.” Id.
94. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 2009).
95. Id. § 100.
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beyond the house of origin. Because Prop 26 is not quite four years old, its
ultimate effect remains unclear and depends on its interpretation and application
by the courts. In the meantime, the use of fees to raise money for water
infrastructure remains uncertain.
B. Investor-Owned Utilities: Public Utilities Commission Regulation
The other significant segment of water suppliers that invest in water
infrastructure are the investor-owned public utilities regulated by the California
96
Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). These private water companies,
represented by the California Water Association, provide water for municipal
uses (e.g., residential, industrial) and account for approximately 20% of the urban
97
water supply.
The CPUC closely regulates public utility investment in water infrastructure.
In order to obtain a certificate of public convenience to serve customers in a
specified area and obtain approval for a rate increase, the public utility must
justify the necessity and sufficiency of its investments in providing adequate
98
service to customers. Public utilities remain subject to CPUC audit and
99
investigation in order to ensure good service. In return, state law protects the
public utility’s monopoly on water service in its area, and the CPUC authorizes
100
water rates that ensure a rate of return for the utility’s investors. In some
communities, the differential in water rates between public utility service areas
and neighboring public agencies can lead to controversy as to water
101
infrastructure costs.

96. CAL. PUB. UTILITIES CODE §§ 201–216 (West 2004); PUB. UTIL. §§ 2701–2703 (West 2010).
97. Water Information, CAL. WATER ASS’N, http://www.calwaterassn.com/water-information/ (last
visited Aug. 12, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, Division of Water
Audits, CA.GOV http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/water/ (last modified June 27, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
98. Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, Division of Water Audits, CA.GOV (last modified June 27, 2014),
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/water/.
99. Id.
100. See PUB UTIL. § 201 (West 2004); see also PUB. UTIL. § 1501 (West 2004).
101. See, e.g., Claremont Residents Want City To Buy Water Company, CBS LOS ANGELES (Nov. 6,
2013), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2013/11/06/claremont-residents-want-city-to-buy-water-company-accused
-of-price-gouging/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also City of Claremont—Water System
Acquisition Information, CITY OF CLAREMONT (June 10, 2014), http://www.ci.claremont.ca.us/ps.topics.
cfm?ID=1800 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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C. Mutual Water Companies: Shareholder Investment Decisions
102

With origins in the 19th century, non-profit mutual water companies
103
continue to provide water service in some communities. While many started as
farmer cooperatives, others were started by developers who chose to create their
own water service for their homebuyers, instead of obtaining a “will-serve letter”
104
from the local public water agency. The new California Mutual Water
Company Association estimates that mutual water companies serve
105
approximately 1.3 million Californians. While some continue to serve their
farmer-owners, many now operate “public water systems” providing drinking
106
water to residential and business customers. The landowner-shareholders pay
all company costs to provide water service, and their voting power is based on
107
the amount of water that they have a right to receive from the company. In
order to invest in water infrastructure, the company may impose an “assessment”
108
on all shares to raise money. State law allows these companies to serve only
their shareholders, who own land served by the company, and certain other users,
109
such as public schools.
Landowner-shareholders have exclusive control over the mutual water
companies, which leaves little room for public oversight in the companies’ water
infrastructure investment decisions. These companies are not subject to CPUC
110
regulation or other public oversight as to their water rates or investments. (If
they operate a public water system, however, the Department of Public Health
111
oversees their drinking water quality. The Board of Directors and the
112
shareholders make all decisions. Renters who receive their drinking water from
113
such companies have no role in the company’s investment or service decisions.

102. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14300–14318 (West 2006). A mutual water company is a type of non-profit
California corporation created by landowners who merge their financial resources and water rights to build and
manage water infrastructure. See Erwin v. Gage Canal Co., 226 Cal. App. 2d 189, 192–93 (4th Dist. 1964).
103. About Mutuals, CAL. ASS’N OF MUT. WATER CO., http://www.calmutuals.org/about-mutuals/ (last
visited July 26, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
104. History of Mutuals, CAL. ASS’N OF MUT. WATER CO., http://www.calmutuals.org/history-ofmutuals.html (last visited July 26, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
105. About Mutuals, CAL. ASS’N OF MUT. WATER CO., http://www.calmutuals.org/ about-mutuals (last
visited July 26, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
106. Id.; CORP. § 14303.
107. CORP. § 14310.
108. Id. § 14303.
109. Id. § 14301.
110. See CAL. PUB UTIL. CODE § 2701. This statute applies only to public utilities that serve “any
person,” not mutual water companies who serve only their shareholders.
111. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 116270 (West 2012).
112. CORP. §§ 14300–14318.
113. Id. §§ 14300–14318.
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Until this year, such customers had no access to company information or Board
114
meetings.
Assembly Bill 240 (Rendon) requires the companies to allow those who
drink their water to attend board meetings and have access to five kinds of
115
documents related to company operations and finances. This new statute arose
out of problems with three mutual water companies serving the City of
Maywood, where 2/3 of residents rent their homes and many complain about
brown and smelly water. The mutual water companies, controlled by landowners,
assert that they cannot afford to invest in improving their water infrastructure
because the city’s residents are poor and cannot afford to pay higher water
116
rates. The companies have not proposed to assess their owners’ shares to raise
117
money for improved water infrastructure. By opening up the process and
ensuring more transparency, AB 240 offers an example of how to improve local
water supplier decisions on investment in water infrastructure.
IV. STATE GENERAL OBLIGATION BOND FOR WATER INFRASTRUCTURE IN 2014?
While the hundreds of local water suppliers make decisions about most
investments in California water infrastructure, the State can play a significant
role when it uses its financial capacity to sell general obligation (GO) bonds for
water infrastructure investments. The 1960 voter decision on the State Water
Project (SWP) involved a GO bond, albeit subject to repayment by the water
users who received SWP water. Since 1996, voters have approved five GO bonds
connected to water, totaling $15.88 billion in water and related natural resource
118
investments. In 2009, the Legislature placed a water bond for $11.14 billion on
the 2010 ballot, but the election was postponed twice based on concerns for weak
119
voter support. This bond will appear on the November 2014 ballot unless the
120
Legislature removes it or passes a replacement bond measure with a 2/3 vote.
Since February 2013, the Legislature has considered how to recast a water bond
121
to replace the one currently on the ballot.

114. Id. § 14305.
115. AB 240, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
116. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 240, at 7 (Apr. 29, 2013).
117. Id.
118. Cal. Proposition 204 (1996); Cal. Proposition 13 (2000); Cal. Proposition 50 (2002); Cal.
Proposition 1E (2006); Cal. Proposition 84 (2006).
119. See SB 27, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); see also AB 1265, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2010); AB 1422, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
120. CAL. CONST., art. XVI § 1.
121. See, e.g., 2013 Informational/Oversight Hearings, CAL. STATE SENATE, http://sntr.senate.ca.gov/
informationaloversighthearings (last visited July 26, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Funding
Principles for Building a Water Bond, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFFICE (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.lao.ca.gov/
Publications/Detail/2696 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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A. The Assembly Water Bond Process
To address 2009 water bond criticism and increase voter support, in May
2013 the California State Assembly began a new, transparent process for
122
developing a water bond for the 2014 ballot. Assembly Speaker John Pérez
appointed a Water Bond Working Group, chaired by the Water, Parks and
123
Wildlife (WPW) Committee Chair Anthony Rendon (D-Lakewood). This
group, which included legislators representing Californians from the Mexican to
the Oregon border, started its work by convening water discussions among
124
legislators from each region.
Based on those legislator discussions, the Working Group established the
125
Proposed Principles for Developing a Water Bond (Principles), which focused
on accountability and priorities for water investments. Then, the Group
126
developed a framework based on those principles. To gain voter confidence,
the Principles framework emphasized the importance of accountability for
127
spending water bond funds. The framework included five categories of
funding—safe drinking water, protection of rivers and the coast, regional water
reliability, Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta (Delta) sustainability, and water
128
storage. At first, the framework allocated $1 billion for each category, but as
testimony and evidence on the needs for investment in each category emerged,
three categories increased to $1.5 billion (protecting rivers, regional water, and
129
storage), for a total of $6.5 billion. The framework became AB 1331 (Rendon),
which was the Assembly’s vehicle for moving the water bond discussion
forward.
Combining the Working Group and his WPW Committee, Rendon convened
multiple public hearings, starting in the Capitol and then convening in
130
communities across California, from Indio to Eureka. This historic public

122. ASSEMBLY WATER, PARKS & WILDLIFE COMM., BACKGROUND: PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPING A
WATER BOND 4 (July 2, 2013), available at http://awpw.assembly.ca.gov/sites/awpw.assembly.ca.gov/files/
Water%20Bond%20Principles%20-%20Background.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter
ASSEMBLY WATER, PARKS & WILDLIFE COMM.].
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. WATER BOND WORKING GROUP, PROPOSED PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPING A WATER BOND (July
2, 2013), available at http://awpw.assembly.ca.gov/sites/awpw.assembly.ca.gov/files/Water%20Bond%20
Principles%20-%20Proposed.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
126. WATER BOND WORKING GROUP, 2013 WATER BOND FRAMEWORK (2013), available at http://awpw.
assembly.ca.gov/sites/awpw.assembly.ca.gov/files/Water%20Bond%20Framework%20-%20814%20Public%20Draft.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Compare WATER BOND WORKING GROUP, 2013 WATER BOND FRAMEWORK (2013), available at
http://awpw.assembly.ca.gov/sites/awpw.assembly.ca.gov/files/Water%20Bond%20Framework%20-%20814%20Public%20Draft.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) with AB 1331, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2014).
130. See Press Release, Anthony Rendon, Cal. Assemb. Member, Statement on Passage of New State

176

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 46
hearing process attracted hundreds of Californians to talk about the state’s most
131
urgent needs for water investments. As the hearings proceeded into the spring
of 2014, AB 1331 increased to $8 billion and Senate Committees heard and
132
moved the bill toward the Senate Floor. Disputes on various parts of AB 1331
133
developed, but the bill continued moving forward.
B. Water Bonds and Water Policy
The water bond debate in California reflects underlying debates about
134
California water policy. The structure of funding in a proposed water bond
135
affects how California water policy objectives are achieved. The water bond
elements often arise out of a water debate or problem that the Legislature has
136
sought to address in previous years. This year’s water bond proposals include
the elements of the water policy debate since the last water bonds passed in
137
2006. The five elements—safe drinking water, river and coastal protection,
regional water reliability, the Delta, and water storage—have received substantial
138
attention in both the Legislature and the public forum. The specific provisions
139
therefore reflect the Legislature’s vision for water policy. To the extent that the
Governor participates in its development, the water bond may include his policies
140
as well.

Water Bond (Aug. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Rendon State Assembly] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
131. Id.
132. AB 1331, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
133. The 2014 Amendments to AB 1331 (Rendon) show the evolution of the bond discussion. The
Assembly Water, Parks & Wildlife Committee’s webpage provides information on its hearings. Water Bond,
CAL. STATE ASSEMB, http://awpw.assembly.ca.gov/waterbond (last visited July 26, 2014) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
134. Jeremy White, Water Bond Leads Agenda as California Lawmakers Return for Final Month,
SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.sacbee.com/2014/08/03/6602416/water-bond-leads-agenda-ascalifornia.html http://www.sacbee.com/2014/08/03/6602416/water-bond-leads-agenda-as-california.html (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
135. California Economic Summit 2013 Summit Report, CAECONOMY.ORG (2013), http://sjvpartnership.
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/SJV-Regional-Economic-Forum_State-Progress-Report.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
136. Id.
137. Compare CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5096.800–5096.967 (West 2007) (codifying Prop. 1E as passed
in 2006), and CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 75050 (West 2007) (codifying part of Prop. 84 as passed in 2006), with
AB 1331 (Rendon 2014) (proposing a repeal and amendment of CAL. WATER CODE §§ 79700-79813).
138. AB 1331, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014). While several water bond proposals are
proceeding at the time of writing, this article will address AB 1331 (Rendon), the Assembly’s primary water
bond vehicle.
139. Rendon State Assembly, supra note 130.
140. Governor Brown did not participate in the bond discussions until June 23, 2014, when he gave the
legislative leadership an outline for a $6 billion water bond. Dan Bacher, Senator Lois Wolk Reintroduces
Revamped $7.5 Billion Water Bond, DAILYKOS.COM (July 7, 2014), http://www.dailykos.com/story/
2014/07/07/1312320/-Senator-Lois-Wolk-reintroduces-revamped-7-5-billion-water-bond# (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
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Safe Drinking Water. For several years, the Assembly has recognized and
worked on addressing the problem of small communities that suffer from unsafe
141
drinking water. Many of these communities can be found in the Central Valley
142
and the Salinas Valley. In 2008, the Legislature passed SB 1 X2 (Perata),
which required the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) to study and
develop pilot projects to help these communities in Tulare County and the
143
Salinas Valley. That legislation resulted in SWRCB recommendations on how
144
to address nitrates in drinking water. In 2013, the Governor signed bills
addressing drinking water quality, many having originated in a bill package
145
developed by the Assembly. The Assembly’s Principles, accordingly included
a priority for safe drinking water projects, with an emphasis on the communities
146
that suffer from poor drinking water quality.
Protecting Rivers and the Coast. Since the last drought in the 1990s,
conflicts over water often have arisen out of declines in river ecosystems and fish
populations, especially those fish listed pursuant to the Endangered Species Act
147
(ESA). Though the conflicts in the Delta have received the most public
attention, conflicts over ESA-listed fish arise throughout the state, from the Santa
148
Ana River to the Klamath River, and especially on coastal streams. State
funding to address these ecosystem declines and other watershed improvement
149
needs has appeared in recent water bonds. The Legislature has treated
environmental needs in watersheds as a “statewide concern” deserving statewide
150
funding from a water bond. Past water bonds have allocated these funds to state
151
conservancies, such as the Coastal Conservancy. AB 1331 proposed a different
141. See CAL. WATER CODE § 83002.5 (West 2004).
142. Sarah Rubin, Reporting on Toxic Drinking Water in the Salinas Valley, USCANNENBERG (Aug. 1,
2013), http://www.reportingonhealth.org/2013/08/01/don%E2%80%99t-drink-water-reporting-toxic-drinkingwater-salinas-valley (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
143. WATER § 83002.5.
144. STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BD., RECOMMENDATIONS ADDRESSING NITRATE IN
GROUNDWATER 48 (2013), available at http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/nitrate_project/
docs/nitrate_rpt.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
145. Governor Brown Signs Water Legislation, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.
gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18258; Press Release, Assembly member Alejo, Governor Signs Clean Water for
Californians Bill Package (Oct. 8, 2013), http://asmdc.org/members/a30/news-room/press-releases/governorsigns-clean-water-for-californians-bill-package (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
146. ASSEMBLY WATER, PARKS & WILDLIFE COMM., supra note 122, at 4.
147. See CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, PROGRAMMATIC RECORD OF DECISION 24 (Aug. 2000); see
also U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION: TRINITY RIVER MAINSTREAM FISHERY RESTORATION
1 (2000).
148. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION: TRINITY RIVER MAINSTREAM FISHERY
RESTORATION 1 (2000).
149. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 79570–79573 (West 2004); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 75050 (West 2007).
150. S. NATURAL RES. & WATER COMM., SETTING THE STATE FOR A 2014 WATER BOND: WHERE ARE
WE AND WHERE DO WE NEED TO GO? 9–10 (Sept. 24, 2013), available at http://sntr.senate.
ca.gov/sites/sntr.senate.ca.gov/files/9-24%20Background%20%282%29.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
151. Id.
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approach. It allocated protecting-rivers/coast funding to regions, but the Senate
Committee on Natural Resources and Water rejected that approach, over the
author’s objections, and replaced that language with allocations to the
152
conservancies.
Regional Water Supply Reliability. In 2002, a previous water bond initiative
measure established funding for Integrated Regional Water Management
(IRWM), to encourage agencies to collaborate in regional water infrastructure
153
development. Since then, this program has developed and expanded, and the
154
2006 Prop 84 included additional allocation of bond funding for IRWM. AB
1331 retained the $1 billion for IRWM that the 2009 water bond included, but
155
added funding for specific categories independent of the IRWM. The regional
water reliability Chapter 7 includes $500 million for water recycling,
desalination, and groundwater cleanup, which are all connected to regional water
156
strategies. It also includes $250 million each for water conservation and
157
stormwater management projects (Senate amendments limited the stormwater
funding to stormwater capture projects for water supply purposes). Discussion
has included proposals to separate groundwater cleanup and water recycling into
158
their own chapters, independent of regional water reliability.
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. Delta funding receives the most attention in
the water bond debate, given that the most intense and most funded opposition to
159
the bond measures on the ballot are from the Delta. Polling shows that voters
only marginally support a new water bond, and voter awareness of negative
messages on the water bond reduce support well below the levels required for the
160
bond’s passage. The continuing Delta ecosystem crisis and climate change,
161
however, calls for additional State bond funding for the Delta. AB 1331
includes three categories of Delta funding—levees, economic sustainability, and
162
ecosystem restoration.

152. Compare AB 1331, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess., § 79734(b)–(c) (as amended Mar. 18, 2014) with
AB 1331, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess., § 79734(b)–(c) (as amended Apr, 8, 2014).
153. WATER § 79501(d) (codifying Prop. 50 as passed in 2002 and declaring the need to “establish and
facilitate integrated regional water management systems and procedures to meet increasing water demands due
to significant population growth that is straining local infrastructure and water supplies”); WATER §§ 1053010548 (codifying the Integrated Regional Water Management Plan).
154. Proposition 84 (Cal. 2006).
155. AB 1331, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as amended June 17, 2014).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. But see AB 2686, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
159. White, supra note 134.
160. David Metz, California Voter Attitudes on Water Policy in 2014, FAIRBANK, MASLIN, MAULLIN,
METZ & ASSOC., ppt. 10 (Apr. 25, 2014), available at http://www.labusinesscouncil.org/files/David_
Metz_PPT.pdf.
161. About the Central Valley Project, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.
jsp?proj_Name=Central+Valley+Project (last updated Sept. 26, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
162. AB 1331, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as amended June 17, 2014).

179

2014 / Who Should Pay to Keep the Tap Running
The controversy over Delta funding for ecosystem restoration arises from the
debate over the Bay-Delta Conservation Plan (BDCP), commonly called “the
Governor’s Tunnels,” which would take water from the Sacramento River to the
163
water export pumps in the South Delta. The 2009 Delta Reform Act (Delta Act)
requires the water exporters who benefit from BDCP to pay for construction and
164
mitigation of environmental impacts from the Delta tunnels. The Delta Act also
requires BDCP to include ecosystem restoration beyond mitigation, sufficient to
165
qualify BDCP as a “Natural Community Conservation Plan.” Where to draw
the line between ecosystem restoration and mitigation, as well as who pays for
the ecosystem restoration have been the questions at the center of the Delta water
166
bond funding debate. Passage of a water bond—by 2/3 of the Legislature and a
majority of voters—will require resolution of these Delta water bond funding
167
issues.
Water Storage. Water bond funding for dams and reservoirs remained at the
168
center of the 2009 water bond discussion.
Then-Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger threatened to veto all bills in 2009 if the Legislature failed to
169
pass a water bond that included funding for dams. Storage continues to play a
170
central role in the 2014 water bond debate. The 2014 storage issues include: (1)
if the bond should “continuously appropriate[ ]” funding for water storage to the
California Water Commission to decide which projects get funds, as the 2009
water bond provided; (2) bond language, as stated in the 2009 water bond, that
would favor Central Valley surface storage reservoirs over groundwater and
other regions that are not connected to the Delta; and (3) the total amount, which
the 2009 water bond put at $3 billion, out of $11 billion then set for the 2014
ballot.
On a separate—but related—issue this year, the Governor has advocated for
171
expanding groundwater planning, management and regulation. His 2014
California Water Action Plan includes a call for sustainable groundwater
172
management. With a continuing drought, California’s Central Valley aquifers

163. John Kirlin, Viewpoints: Bay Delta Conservation Plan is a 50-Year Gamble, SACRAMENTO BEE,
May 18, 2014, http://www.sacbee.com/2014/05/18/6409422/viewpoints-bay-delta-conservation.html.
164. CAL. WATER CODE § 85089 (West 2004).
165. Id. § 85320(b)(2)(A).
166. White, supra note 134.
167. Id.
168. Samantha Young, New Dams Critical for Water Supply, THE REPORTER, Aug. 19, 2009,
http://www.thereporter.com/news/ci_13156869 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
169. Id.
170. See AB 1331, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
171. Wayne Lusvardi, Gov. Brown, Legislature Push Groundwater Regulation, CALWATCHDOG (Mar.
14, 2014), http://calwatchdog.com/2014/03/14/gov-brown-legislature-push-groundwater-regulation/ (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
172. CAL. NATURAL RES. AGENCY ET AL., CALIFORNIA WATER ACTION PLAN 14 (2014), available at
http://resources.ca.gov/california_water_action_plan/docs/Final_California_Water_Action_Plan.pdf (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
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have seen rapid depletion, leading many Valley leaders to call for better
173
management of the region’s groundwater. The California Water Foundation,
led by former Natural Resources Agency Secretary Lester Snow, issued a report
to the Brown Administration in May 2014 that recognized the growing consensus
on the need for groundwater management and groundwater management funding,
174
including a 2014 water bond. While AB 1331 includes funding for groundwater
storage and cleanup, its May 8 version did not specifically include funding for
175
development of groundwater management plans. The bill did, however, require
that proponents of projects related to groundwater demonstrate that a public
176
agency has sufficient authority to manage the groundwater. Given the
Governor’s actions to improve groundwater management statewide, funding for
improving groundwater management and planning may appear in the final
version of the bond that goes on the November 2014 ballot. This may depend on
whether the Legislature passes a replacement for the $11.14 billion water bond
177
that was moved to the 2014 ballot in 2012.
C. Water Finance Policies Incorporated Into Water Bonds
As the Legislature has developed water bonds over the last twenty years, it
has adopted certain policies or principles in deciding what belongs in a statewide
178
water bond. In some cases, these policies apply to other kinds of water
179
financing tools, such as proposals for statewide water fees. They originate in
water policy discussions about the State’s role in encouraging or discouraging
actions by regional or local water agencies, which actually deliver water to
customers. As water bond bills develop, they incorporate these policies into their
180
language, either at introduction or as the policy committees review the bills.
The 2013 Assembly Water Bond Working Group adopted the Principles that
181
reflected many of these policies. Its first principle focused on setting “critical

173. Lusvardi, supra note 171.
174. CAL. WATER FOUND., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT:
DEVELOPED THROUGH A STAKEHOLDER DIALOGUE 30–31 (2014), available at http://www.californiawater
foundation.org/uploads/1399077265-GroundwaterReport-52014%2800249329xA1C15%29.pdf (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
175. See AB 1331, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
176. Id. (proposing an amendment of CAL. WATER CODE §§ 79723, 79748, 79768(b)).
177. Lusvardi, supra note 171.
178. STATE GOVERNANCE & FINANCE COMM. & SENATE NATURAL RESOURCES & WATER COMM., OVERVIEW
OF CALIFORNIA’S DEBT CONDITION: PRIMING THE PUMP FOR A WATER BOND 9–11 (2013), available at http://sntr.
senate.ca.gov/sites/sntr.senate.ca.gov/files/Background-Final.pdf [hereinafter CALIFORNIA’S DEBT CONDITION] (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
179. See AB 34, 2010–2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
180. See generally ASSEMB. WATER BOND WORKING GROUP PROPOSED PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPING
A WATER BOND 4 (2013), available at http://awpw.assembly.ca.gov/sites/awpw.assembly.ca.gov/files/
Water%20Bond%20Principles%20-%20Proposed.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
181. Id.
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182

statewide water policy priorities” for water bond funding. Its second principle
emphasized accountability to voters for how the State spends water bond
183
money. Its third and fourth principles emphasized respect for existing law and
184
policy, how they relate to water rights and protection of the Delta. The
Working Group and the hearings that followed reflected a unique effort at
transparency in developing a water bond, which is perhaps another developing
185
policy for water finance.
Some of the most significant policies for State water infrastructure finance
and water bonds include:
$ Statewide Interests. The Senate Committee on Natural Resources and
Water has framed this policy as “State Funds For State
186
The Committee explained that the State
Responsibilities.”
Government has accepted responsibility for certain activities related
to water, such as protecting the public trust and public health, and
setting statewide standards and rules of behavior for the local
187
agencies that deliver water. Because taxpayers throughout the state
pay off the debt created by a water bond, the water bond funding
188
should support statewide objectives.
$ Beneficiary Pays. This principle is the converse of the statewide
interest policy: those who receive water from infrastructure should
pay the cost of that infrastructure. While this principle has long been
advocated, the Legislature has found it difficult to implement. Project
proponents often describe the public benefits broadly and private
benefits narrowly. In addition, some disadvantaged communities
cannot afford to pay for the infrastructure to provide clean and safe
drinking water, so the State—stepping into its public health role—
pays for this fundamental water infrastructure. AB 1331 encourages
this principle, but it does not impose the principle as a requirement for
189
funding from the water bond. It also targets safe drinking water
190
specifically for disadvantaged communities.
$ Polluter Pays. Similar to the “beneficiary pays” principle, the state
should not charge taxpayers statewide to fix a problem caused by an

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
CALIFORNIA’S DEBT CONDITION, supra note 178, at 9.
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Id.
AB 1331, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (amending CAL. WATER CODE § 79709).
Id. (amending CAL. WATER CODE §§ 79720–79729).
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identifiable party. Bonds have applied this principle in prohibitions on
paying for mitigation or environmental compliance, or in
requirements that recovery from polluters should be paid back to the
191
State. As environmental regulation has developed, some compliance
efforts have become water supply strategies, such as stormwater
capture and management. For that reason, the May 8 version of AB
1331 included this narrower prohibition language: “[f]unds provided
by this division shall not be expended to support or pay for penalties
192
or correcting violations.”
The Senate Committee on Natural Resources and Water, in a February 2013
193
background paper, identified several other policies that it recommended,
194
including: (1) state funds for state responsibilities; (2) subsidies should be
195
avoided; (3) “bonds should aid in implementation of policy,” not create
196
197
policy; and (4) “respect separation of powers.” The Legislature is likely to
incorporate these policies and others, such as the principles arising out of the
Assembly Water Bond Working Group, into water bonds in the years ahead. A
constant challenge in crafting a water bond is balancing statewide policies and
principles with the need to address the most immediate needs for water
198
infrastructure funding that will attract votes from legislators and voters.
D. The Most Difficult Water Bond Issues
The Legislature continued discussing a replacement water bond through the
199
June 26 deadline for placing a new water bond on the November 2014 ballot.
Three days before the deadline, the Senate took up Senator Wolk’s $10.5 billion

191. Cal. Proposition 84 (containing a prohibition on mitigation and groundwater cleanup provisions).
192. AB 1331, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (amending CAL. WATER CODE § 79709).
193. CALIFORNIA’S DEBT CONDITION, supra note 178, at 1.
194. Id. at 9. As explained in this Background Paper, the State Government has responsibility for certain
water and natural resource activities, such as protecting the public trust, public health and providing flood
protection in the Central Valley. Id.
195. Id. at 10. When statewide bond funds are used for purposes that are not a state responsibility,
“should be characterized as a subsidy.” Id. These non-state responsibilities should be paid with private or local
government funding. Id.
196. Id. Bonds provide funding for implementing policy, but cannot be changed, without voter approval,
even as conditions change and necessitate changes in policy.
197. Id. As explained in this Background Paper, in funding state programs, the Governor proposes a State
Budget but the Legislature has responsibility to determine how best to spend state funding, including bond
funds. Therefore, a bond that provides a continuous appropriation of funding to a particular program (e.g.
storage) abdicates the Legislature’s responsibility to make annual decisions as to how to spend state funding. Id.
198. Memo from David Metz and Curtis Below of Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin, Metz, & Assoc. on
Californians’ Perceptions of the Drought (June 16, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
199. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9040 (West 2003) (requiring that the Legislature place measures on the
ballot at least 131 days before the election). For the November 4, 2014, election, that deadline was June 26,
2014. See id.
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water bond, SB 848, on the Senate floor, but it failed to gain the two-thirds vote
200
necessary to pass a bond measure on a 22–9 vote. The next day, the Governor
201
gave legislative leaders an outline for a $6 billion water bond.
Assembly Speaker Toni Atkins convened Assembly members, from both
202
sides of the aisle, who had participated in the water bond debate. Assembly
Appropriations Committee cancelled several hearings on AB 2686 (Perea) and
AB 2043 (Bigelow/Conway) scheduled during the final weeks before the summer
203
break commenced on July 3rd because no agreement emerged. The Speaker
focused on gaining bi-partisan support that could lead to a two-thirds vote on the
204
Senate floor, and developed proposed amendments to AB 2686 for a bond at
205
$8.25 billion. The Appropriations Committee cancelled the July 2 hearing
when the Republican leadership rejected the proposal.
The “sticking points” that prevented the necessary votes raised the same
issues that both houses discussed vigorously the previous year—water storage
and the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta:
$

Water Storage. Historically, water users paid (or at least repaid) the
206
costs to build California’s dams. The 2009 water bond proposed
(for the first time) that taxpayers pay up to 50% of dam costs for
“public benefits” related to the environment, flood protection, and
207
recreation. It authorized and continuously appropriated $3 billion
to the California Water Commission for building surface or
groundwater storage facilities. The 2009 water bond language
skewed the storage funding toward Central Valley dams, with
language requiring “measurable improvements to the Delta

200. See SB 848, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (showing that the bill failed on the senate
floor).
201. Melanie Mason, Governor Pushes for Scaled Down Water Bond, CUWCC (June 26, 2014),
http://www.cuwcc.org/Home/gov-jerry-brown-pushes-for-scaled-down-6-billion-water-bond-582 at 1 (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
202. Water Bond Off Unitl Aug., BAY PLANNING COALITION (July 3, 2014), http://bayplanning
coalition.org/2014/07/water-bond-off-until-august/.
203. While the legal deadline was June 26, the Legislature could exempt a new water bond from that
deadline. But several legislators asserted that the real deadline was before summer break, to pre-empt the
Secretary of State from preparing a ballot pamphlet for the 2009 water bond then on the ballot. White, supra
note 134.
204. The Senate had lost its 2/3 Democratic supermajority earlier in the year, when three Democratic
Senators could no longer vote due to legal problems. Stephen Frank, Corrupt State Senate Democrats Kill
Super-Majority, CAPOLITICALNEWS.COM (Mar. 3, 2014), http://capoliticalnews.com/2014/03/03/corrupt-statesenate-democrats-kill-super-majority/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
205. On Topic: Assembly Speaker Toni Atkins Discusses Water Bond, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, July 7,
2014, http://www.sacbee.com/2014/07/07/6532998/on-topic-assembly-speaker-toni.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
206. HANAK ET AL., supra note 15, at 9.
207. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 2 X7, at 1 (Nov. 4, 2009).
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208

and defining
ecosystem or to the tributaries to the Delta”
209
recreational use as a public benefit (groundwater aquifers provide
little recreational benefit). Republicans insisted that storage funding
210
had to remain at $3 billion with the 2009 language intact. Both SB
211
848 and AB 2686 included the 2009 language with little change.
The Speaker’s proposed amendments to AB 2686, however, set the
212
storage funding at $2.75 billion.
$

The Delta. Senator Wolk and advocates for the Delta had long
opposed the 2009 water bond because it allowed funding for
ecosystem restoration related to the BDCP. BDCP proposed to
achieve the “Co-Equal Goals” of water supply reliability and Delta
213
ecosystem restoration, as provided in the 2009 Delta Reform Act.
The Plan, which had become known as “the Governor’s Tunnels,”
proposed to transfer water south from the Sacramento River to water
214
export pumping facilities in the South Delta. At the time of the
bond discussions, the BDCP was out for public comment, pursuant
to the California Environmental Quality Act. The three Democratic
bond proposals—SB 848, AB 1331, and AB 2686—had studiously
avoided any mention of BDCP. SB 848, however, consistently
required that all Delta ecosystem restoration funding be allocated to
the Delta Conservancy, whose eleven-member board included five
215
representatives of the Delta Counties. That provision led to
opposition from the state and federal water contractors, and
216
effectively, SB 848’s failed passage on June 23.
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The conflicts over a new water bond reflect the underlying conflicts over
how California manages and pays for its management of water resources. The
biggest issues—storage and the Delta—go to the heart of the questions that
California water leaders now ponder. With climate change reducing snowpack—
the state’s biggest reservoir—and increasing drought, how will California store
and share its water among agriculture, cities and the environment? The Delta
remains the heart of the California water system, as well as the most valuable
estuary ecosystem on the west coast of North or South America. How will
California manage this environmental jewel for its many competing uses? The
list of water bond issues continues, on groundwater cleanup, water recycling,
watersheds, and others. Those issues similarly reflect conflicts over water
management.
Perhaps the one issue that receives broad bi-partisan, legislative support is
safe drinking water. Drinking water quality draws the support of voters as well.
In years like 2014, when newspapers reported that seventeen small communities
217
were threatened with running out of water completely within sixty days, safe
drinking water became a critical issue for legislators and voters alike. The
chapters on safe drinking water were substantially similar among the Democratic
218
water bond bills. Polling shows that voters will support a bond to pay for safe
219
drinking water for all Californians. As legislators continue to encounter
conflict, safe drinking water may be the one segment that survives the conflict,
whether in 2014 or in a subsequent year if voters reject the water bond proposal
on the November ballot.
The question for future water bond debates will be how California resolves
its water conflicts. Will the state make the decision to alter how it conveys water
across the Delta to the San Francisco Bay Area, San Joaquin Valley, and
Southern California? Will it build big new dams or will it better manage its
biggest groundwater aquifer in the Central Valley? Will it cleanup its
contaminated groundwater, especially in Southern California? Will the state
achieve its goal of using 3 million acre-feet of recycled water by 2030? How will
California implement the “Human Right to Water,” adopted in 2012, to ensure
that “every human being has the right to safe, clean, affordable, and accessible
220
water adequate for human consumption, cooking, and sanitary purposes”?
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Ultimately, voters will decide. They will judge whether water policymakers
have resolved their conflicts in a way that taxpayers are willing to support by
221
approving a water bond and paying taxes to repay the bond debt. A recent Los
Angeles Times poll showed that, despite public awareness of the serious drought,
a majority of respondents would not support “large-scale public spending to
222
boost water supplies.” The challenge for any water bond measure on the
statewide ballot will be convincing voters not only that there is a need for new
223
water infrastructure, but that the proposed solutions are worth the cost. That is
the challenge that legislators face in 2014 and beyond.
V. CONCLUSION
Conflicts and compromise over water shaped California from its inception
224
with the 49ers. Since then the state—and its water—developed into the bread
basket for the world. Some of the world’s great cities have been created, even
where there was not enough water to support such world-class cities. Each
generation has passed laws to resolve water conflicts and build a water system
225
for future generations. Our predecessors built a statewide water system admired
the world over—a great accomplishment for the 20th century. California’s 21st
century challenge will be restoring its world leadership in water by providing
safe and clean water for its people and economy.”
The greatest part of that challenge is figuring out how to pay for the
226
necessary water infrastructure. The next generation of water infrastructure will
227
demand substantial financial investment. With its water infrastructure aging
and climate change leading to more intense droughts, California cannot afford to
ignore its deficiencies in water infrastructure. Just as water built the robust
California economy, failing water infrastructure can destroy it. Investment is the
key to California’s future.
Making sufficient investments in water will take support from all
228
Californians. We have established a water finance system, rooted in the
California Constitution, which ensures that California voters play important roles
229
in state and local water investment decisions. The State needs voter approval of
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230

water bonds and local agencies need property owner acceptance of increased
water rates. Convincing voters of the urgent need for water investments is,
therefore, critical to California’s water future. Unfortunately, convincing voters
231
to open their wallets and support water bonds often takes a crisis.
In the last decade, a flood crisis led to voter support for flood control bonds.
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina brought public attention to flood risks throughout the
nation, and California’s state capital suddenly became the American city most at
232
risk of flooding. That same year, the State Legislature approved a $500 million
233
payment to settle a claim from a prior flood. Californians began learning about
flood risks in the Central Valley and the deterioration of the federal-state flood
control system. The next year, Californian’s approved billions of dollars of GO
234
bonds to fix levees and improve Central Valley flood protection.
Convincing voters to support state and local investments in water supply
infrastructure may take another crisis. This year’s serious drought may be the
start of that crisis, but voters need to see a connection between the crisis and their
own lives. Reduced snowpack or wilting crops hundreds of miles away may not
be enough to make the crisis real for voters. The crisis needs to affect voters in
the coastal cities, where most of them live. Successful investment in California’s
water future may need to start with a crisis at the tap. When voters see first-hand
that California’s water system needs improvement, they may be more likely to
support the substantial financing it would require to accomplish that
improvement. Ironically, the future of California’s civilization may depend on
the apparent failure of its water system. Then the state can once again be
successful in investing in the water system for the 21st century.
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